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Background and Problem: Recently there has been a relaxation process regarding 
audit regulations going on in EU. The goal was to lessen the administrative burdens 
by 25 % by 2012. As a response to this the Swedish government decided to abolish 
the statutory audit for small companies in 2010. Many European countries have come 
further in their relaxation process but the real effects of the Swedish change in 
legislation are as yet unknown.  
 
Aim of study: This thesis has investigated whether expectations stated by different 
actors prior to the change in legislation, from a small companies perspective, have 
been fulfilled. By applying generally accepted economic theories to the observed 
outcomes the authors hope to explain and understand what have affected small 
companies experiences.  
 
Methodology: Information regarding expectations was gathered by reviewing the 
position on the topic given by different representatives and institutions prior to the 
change in legislation. By using a web survey these expectations were then compared 
with the views of companies who had opted out of audit.  
 
Analysis and Conclusion: One of the main objectives with the changed legislation 
was to increase Swedish companies global competitiveness by reducing cost and 
administrative burdens. The research, however, found that the majority of small 
Swedish companies did not operate on a global market. Despite this the companies 
have made large cost savings even though many of them still employ complementary 
services similar to the services previously provided by the auditor. 85 % of the 
respondents claimed that they were satisfied with their decision to opt out of audit and 
the vast majority did not consider missing out on any added value. The explanation to 
the above, may be, that economic theories are often used to describe the purpose, 
benefits and demands of audit for big companies and therefor seems inadequate when 
the same principals are applied to small companies. The research points to an overall 
satisfaction amongst the surveyed companies in their decision to opt out of audit, 
hence making the initiative successful.  
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Glossary	  
	  
BFR -  
Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen – Is the Danish business authority.  
FAR – Is the professional institute for authorized public auditors, approved public 
auditors, and other highly qualified professionals in the accountancy sector in 
Sweden.  
Företagarna – Is Sweden’s largest association, representing the interests of small 
businesses.   
ISA – “International Standards on Auditing”, are professional standards for the 
performance of financial audit of financial information.  
Skatteverket – The Swedish Tax Agency 
Svenskt Näringsliv –	  “The Confederation of Swedish Enterprise”, is the largest 
business federation in Sweden, representing 60 000 member companies.	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1.	  Introduction 
In this chapter a background to the problem and a review of the ongoing processes in the EU 
will lead up to a problem discussion that turns into a disclosure of the problem statement. The 
purpose of the thesis and limitations will also be discussed.  
1.1	  Background	  
During the last few centuries the auditor has had a prominent role in the Swedish 
economy. It had been common practice in companies during the 19th century to have 
an auditor but law first stipulated it in the Companies Act of 1895.1 The auditors’ role 
was to act as a means to ensure that information given to the stakeholders of the 
company was accurate and reliable.  
 
In the early 1980s the Swedish Companies Act was reformed. The government found 
that the supply of approved auditors at this time was sufficient enough to force every 
limited company into appointing an authorized or qualified auditor.2 In 1983 the 
Companies Act was revised not only due to the increase in qualified auditors but also 
because of a drive from the Swedish government to crack down on financial crimes. 
Statutory auditing was now a fact.3  
1.1.1	  A	  new	  Era	  of	  Auditing	  Regulations	  
The processes regarding legislation and regulation have changed following the 
Swedish entry in the European Union. The decision-making has in many ways 
transformed from mostly being influenced by domestic demands and opinions to a 
wider perspective where consideration has to be given to EU-directives and 
legislation.4 EU directives today heavily influence the way auditing and accounting 
regulations are stipulated in Sweden.5  	  
The directive that ultimately governs the statutory auditing in the EU is the Fourth 
Council Directive, introduced into legislation on the 25th of July 1978. This legislation 
serves as a basis to coordinate financial reporting in the EU. The Swedish auditing 
regulations in limited companies are to a large extent based on these directives.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Öhman P & Wallerstedt E, (2012), p. 244 
2 Wallerstedt E (2001), p. 13 
3 Johansson, Häckner, Wallerstedt (2005), p.39 
4 SOU 2008:32 
5 European Commission, (2012)	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The Fourth Council Directive also provides an option for each member state to 
exempt certain companies from the statutory audit. For a company to utilize this 
exemption rule they have to qualify as either a small or a medium sized company. 
Note that an exemption from the statutory audit is not permitted for publicly traded 
companies.6  
1.1.2	  Simplification	  Process	  
In 2007 the European council stressed the importance of lessening the administrative 
burdens for small companies by 25 % by 20127, in order to make European small 
companies more competitive on a global market.8 The Swedish government 
conducted an investigation, which concluded that the cost for accounting and auditing 
in small and medium sized companies was particularly burdensome, and that these 
companies would experience favorable marginal effects if the burdens were lessened. 
The investigation also found that an abolishment of the statutory audit might lead to a 
reduction of costs by as much as 5.8 billion SEK per year for small businesses. These 
findings resulted in that a bill was passed on the 1st of November 2010, which 
abolished statutory audit for small companies.9 However, the threshold of the audit 
exemption for small businesses was set at a very low level in comparison to both the 
initial proposition and the thresholds set for other European member countries.  
1.2	  Problem	  Discussion	  
Today most EU countries have abandoned statutory audit for small businesses, a 
change in line with the Fourth Council Directive. The UK, for example, was an early 
adopter in the field and abandoned the statutory audit as early as 1994. The initiative 
has been a success and during a 10-year period the UK-thresholds have gradually 
increased and finally matched the EU maxima thresholds in 2004. Many other 
countries in the European Union have had the same experience from utilizing the 
audit exemption rules.10 Sweden, however, was a late adopter and the real effects of 
the changed legislation are as yet unknown.  
 
The change in Swedish regulation that took effect in 2010 was based on the 
government investigation SOU 2008:32. The investigation’s main focus was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC	  
7 Communication from Commission, (2007) 
8 SOU 2008:32 
9 ibid.  
10 Broberg A, (2008) 
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exempting small businesses from the audit requirement even though the proposition 
also stated several other ways of removing some of the economic and administrative 
burdens.11  
 
It was never questioned whether an abolishment of the statutory audit was to be 
executed or not. The discussion that followed mainly focused on what level the 
thresholds should be set at, and the investigation suggested the EU maxima thresholds 
to be used.12  
 
The bill was revised several times before it was passed and the thresholds were finally 
set at the lowest possible level accepted by EU and the Fourth Council Directive.13 
With the set thresholds it was estimated that approximately 250 000 entities, 
corresponding to 70 % of the Swedish limited liability companies, were to be 
exempted from the audit requirement.14 The decision to set the thresholds at the 
minimum levels allowed was due to concerns raised by several different actors. The 
Swedish tax agency, “Skatteverket”, feared an increase in the tax gap15 and the 
Secretary General of FAR, Dan Brännström claimed that a change in regulation might 
lead to  “chaos á la Big Bang”.16 FAR questioned whether the administrative burdens 
would actually be lessened considering that the change in regulation would probably 
come at a cost, including increased tax checks, transaction costs and more difficulties 
for companies to obtain credit.17 
 
Other actors disputed these claims. Svenskt Näringsliv and Företagarna, two 
associations representing the interests of small businesses in Sweden, were positive 
about the development. They claimed that the benefits of abolishing the statutory 
audit would exceed its costs and that companies alone can make rational decisions on 
whether to be audited or not.18 19   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 SOU 2008:32 
12 See Appendix I 
13 See Appendix I 
14 Regeringskansliet, (2010) 
15 SOU 2008:32 
16 Balans, (2008) 
17 ECON (2007) 
18 Thorell P & Norberg C (2005) 
19 Företagarna (2010) 
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Despite the polarized debate and the different expectations brought forward by all 
actors involved, both those in favor of change and those against, they all agreed on 
one aspect: it was the interests of the small companies that should be considered.20  
 
With these preconditions it is interesting to examine what experiences the business 
owners have had during the three and a half years elapsed since the legislation was 
passed in November 2010.   
1.3	  Problem	  Statement	  
The previous discussion led to the following problem statement: 
• How have Swedish companies been affected by their decision to opt out of 
audit after the change in regulation experience, have they experienced the 
anticipated effects stated by external actors involved in the design of the 
changed legislation?	  
 
1.4	  Purpose	  
The purpose of the thesis was to explain the anticipated effects of an abolishment of 
the statutory audit and whether these expectations had been met. Furthermore, an 
analysis of the actual outcomes was to be made, based on generally accepted 
economic theories, in an attempt to explain and understand what has affected 
businesses’ experiences regarding the changed legislation. By evaluating the 
experienced outcome from the changed legislation in Sweden and comparing these to 
the stated expectations, the objective was to conclude whether the initiative had been 
favorable for small business owners. By doing so, the aim was to contribute to further 
knowledge in the debate regarding relaxation of audit regulations. 
1.5	  Limitations	  
Several previous investigations have attempted to highlight the socioeconomic effects 
of an abolishment of the statutory audit. The investigations suggested that the changed 
legislation would probably lead to a number of societal and socioeconomic effects. 
This thesis was, however, based on the direct perspective of small business owners, 
the ones that the legislation is ultimately intended to target, regardless of other 
economic effects accompanying the changed legislation.	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 SOU 2008:32	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2.	  Method	  
In this chapter the bases of the research will be presented. The scientific approach, the 
research design chosen to conduct the study and the way the thesis will analyze findings will 
also be discussed.  
2.1	  Research	  Philosophy	  
The thesis was driven by a positivistic research philosophy. Research conducted in a 
positivistic manner strives to be both value-free and objective. A thesis with a 
positivistic research philosophy starts by developing a theoretical framework, 
providing theoretical expectations that then are tested to see which of these supports 
or reject the theoretical forecasts, and whether these forecasts can be generalized for 
an entire population.21 The thesis theoretical framework was intended to serve as an 
explanation, investigating the general forces affecting small businesses’ views on 
audit. By conducting a survey revealing the business owners’ experiences of the 
changed legislation, the theoretical hypotheses were tested.  
2.2	  Research	  Design	  
The thesis objective was to compare the entrepreneurs’ expectations of the changed 
legislation with the actual outcomes. The objective was not to examine whether 
expectations were consistent with the outcome of individual companies, but what the 
overall view of the changed legislation was among affected business owners. The 
answers given by the entrepreneurs were then linked to the theoretical framework 
based on different widely accepted theories, both coherent and contradictory. The 
linkage between the conducted research and applied theoretical framework served as a 
tool to draw conclusions on why entrepreneurs experienced the anticipated effects the 
way they did.  
 
In order to conduct a study of this nature, the authors had to find out what the actual 
expectations were before the change in legislation. One possible approach would have 
been to conduct a pre-study, examining what the expectations were on a specific 
group of companies, followed up by another study that investigated the actual 
outcomes. A study of this magnitude would have been time consuming, and to 
construct a study based on vague memories from business owners expectations’ from 
several years ago would in the authors’ opinion not serve as a strong base from which 
to draw conclusions. Instead information regarding expectations of the abolishment of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Blumberg B, p. 20, (2005) 
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the statutory audit was gathered by reviewing the position on the topic given by 
representatives from different associations and institutions at the time.  
2.2.1	  Research	  Method	  
To be able to compare and draw conclusions from the research, a great number of 
respondents were needed. A qualitative research method would have been able to 
capture business owners’ opinions regarding the changed regulation. However, such a 
method would only have supplied a limited scope and would not have enabled an 
objective comparison between the answers given. A quantitative method approach 
was chosen to satisfy the criterion of a larger scope as well as supply objective and 
comparable data. It would also enable the possibility to draw statistical conclusions.22 
The advantages of the quantitative approach were believed to best fit the purpose of 
the thesis.  
2.2.2	  Survey	  
The research conducted was based on a web survey sent out to companies that prior to 
the changed legislation had an auditor but choose to opt out of audit.  
 
A web survey is easy to analyze objectively and can be conducted at a low cost, with 
fast responses and it allows collected data to be easily compiled. The main 
disadvantage of this data-collection method was the risk of low response rates. 
Therefore, it was important to follow up with a reminder at the end of the timeframe 
given for them to answer. 23  
 
The tool that was used for conducting the research was the web-based service, 
webbenkater.com.  
 
The most straightforward way to collect the entrepreneurs’ opinions would have been 
to conduct a survey based only on yes or no questions. However, this would have 
given the respondents little or no leeway to express subjective views on the matter 
and it might have forced them into express opinions that differ from their actual view. 
The survey therefore consisted mainly of questions asked as statements, where the 
respondents answered on a semantic differential rating scale graded from 1 to 5, a so 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Bryman & Bell, p. 26-28, (2011) 
23 Bryman & Bell, p. 662-669, (2011) 
	   8	  
called Likert-type scale, where 1 represented “strongly disagree” and 5 “strongly 
agree”. This type of scale is common and was considered to fit the purpose of the data 
collection well. The responses were interpreted as ordinal data. This interpretation 
means that the responses have a rank order, but the intervals between the values 
cannot be presumed to be equal.24  
2.2.2.1	  Withdrawn	  Question	  
Question number 14 in the survey regarded the administrative routines the auditor 
provided as an added value, and how an abolishment of the statutory audit may have 
caused companies to suffer structural losses. The question was included in the survey 
because there were indications that public companies in some cases had experienced 
an increase in administrative burdens after guidelines and regulations had been 
abolished. The authors hoped to find evidence that this was also the case in private 
small companies, and that these companies suffered the same consequences. The 
question was included in the survey despite a lack of theories supporting the argument 
but to allow for more time to browse through academic literature. Despite a rigorous 
search effort no literature was found that supported the indications. Based on the 
situation it was decided to remove the question from both the theoretical framework 
and the analysis.  
2.2.3	  Sample	  
2nd of February 2014 there were 194,83325 Swedish companies that had chosen to opt 
out of audit. In order to compare expectations with outcomes the target population 
had to consist of companies that have had experience of employing an auditor. 
Therefor this study targeted companies that prior to the 1st of November 2010 had an 
auditor but chose to opt out of audit when the option became available. Another 
criterion that had to be met was that the companies included in the study still had to 
be active. With these criterions met, the population amounted to 87,291 companies.26 
To be able to conduct the study pragmatically, the scope of respondents had to be 
limited.  
 
A simple random sample was the most fair selection process as this gave each 
company equal chance to be included in the survey. With the population size of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Blaikie N, (2003) 
25 Retriever business (17/2-14) 
26 ibid 
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87,291 companies, an estimated confidence interval of 90% and a margin of error at 
6%, the sample size needed was approximated to 189 companies.27 Initially, the 
survey was sent out to 600 companies but as the risk of low response rate was 
imminent the random sample was raised to 1100 companies. Due to the population 
size and the sample size required, every 80th company on the list was chosen.  
 
E-mail addresses to the companies were sought online. The companies to whom 
addresses could not be found were deleted and the company below on the list was 
chosen instead.   
2.3	  Theoretical	  Data	  Collection	  
Data collected from secondary sources served as the foundation to support the 
theoretical framework as well as the problem and empirical background. The data was 
mainly collected through the University of Gothenburg’s library search engines, e.g. 
Web of Science and Retriever, where scientific peer-reviewed articles were found. 
Library books served as a complement to these sources. Furthermore information 
published by public institutions such as the Swedish government and Skatteverket 
was found on their respective websites.  
 
Phrases and words used in search engines include: audit, voluntary, statutory audit, 
audit society, mandatory audit, regulations, Denmark, UK, Fourth Council Directive, 
and added value.  
2.4	  Analysis	  Method	  
When analyzing the empirical data, the tool provided by webbenkater.com was used. 
This tool provided comprehensible data that were easy to summarize and analyze. 
When using a method that provides ordinal data, it is not possible to analyze the 
findings with parametric statistical methods. To be able to analyze the ordinal data, 
non-parametric statistical methods were used. The thesis responses were analyzed by 
calculating median numbers from individual questions in an attempt to find whether 
the outcome matched the expectations. The Likert-type scale was graded from 1 to 5, 
where alternatives 4 and 5 indicated that the respondents agreed that the expectations 
had been met. Therefore, a median number greater than 3 was considered a match 
between the stated expectation and the experienced outcome.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Appendix II 
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To fulfill the full purpose of the thesis, an expanded explanation of the observed 
matches/mismatches had to be conducted. Every expectation was based on theories 
(see Table of Expectations). By combining questions with the proper expectations, 
coupled with the theoretical framework, a more valid view on why business owners 
thought and experienced the situation the way they do may be found.  
2.4.2	  Analysis	  Limitations	  
In the survey one response option was ”unchanged”. This option may be interpreted 
differently depending on the question stated. The answers ”unchanged” can in some 
cases be interpreted as both ”agree” and ”disagree” e.g. in question 15 regarding cost 
savings the answer ”unchanged” is more likely to represent a disagreement with the 
statement. This misdemeanors have, however, been noted and this has been taken into 
account when analyzing the answers given.   	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3.Theoretical	  Framework	  
This chapter will provide a theoretical framework for the thesis. In this chapter generally 
accepted economic theories will serve as a base in trying to explain the purpose and demand 
of audit. As an antipode to these theories Michael Power’s view of increasing pressure due to 
audit will also be discussed.   
	  
3.1	  A	  Brief	  History	  of	  Audit	  
To monitor and check up on each other is part of the rational individual. Often 
pursued unconsciously, but if a sense of doubt, conflict, mistrust or danger is 
perceived an intensified examining of accounts occur. If this is regarded to be the 
case, receipts are checked carefully and bank statements scrutinized. The human need 
for measuring, reviewing and auditing are not new ideas; they can be traced far back 
in time. During the 13th century, mankind wanted to audit their successes in 
miscellaneous areas, such as agriculture and trade. Societies in different times have 
focused on different areas of measurement and audits.28 
 
The financial audit stretches back longer than other forms of audit present in today’s 
society. Financial audit has existed as long as there been commerce. It is thought that 
the earliest forms of financial audit were an oral tradition. Over time it has evolved to 
keep up with the volume and complexity of transactions, developing accounting 
records and statements to serve as an evidential base, supplementing the oral 
traditions of proof.29  
3.2	  The	  Purpose	  of	  Financial	  Audit	  
As the financial audit developed, questions concerning its primary objective and 
purpose arose. One view is that early forms of the audit process were to review every 
transaction, making sure that assets were not embezzled. This view placed no 
emphasis on management and their performance in managing the allocated resources, 
nor on the verification of financial statements. This points to a close historical relation 
between audit and the detection of fraud and error, a view that is still today used by 
some to explain the purpose of financial audit.30 
 
The detection of fraud and error has served as a basis in the international debate 
regarding the purpose of audit for a long period of time. Some authors, mainly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Power M, (2004) 
29 Power M, (1997) 
30 Power M, (1997) 
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American and British, however, claim that the verification of financial statement has 
been the objective since as early as 1840.31 This conceptual confusion between two 
widely differing audit legislation theories was not fully resolved until after 1940, 
when it was generally agreed that fraud was not the main objective of audit.32 Instead 
the provision of a qualified opinion on the financial statement became the primary 
purpose.33  
 
This purpose is well aligned with the Swedish legislation concerning the auditors’ 
present role. The Swedish auditors’ task is to review a company's annual report and 
accounting together with a review of the management´s administration. At the end of 
the fiscal year it is the auditors’ duty to hand down an audit report.34 An auditor’s 
statements functions as assurance towards the stakeholders of a company, assuring 
them that the information presented is trustworthy and correct.35 Another piece of 
evidence that the detection of fraud and economic crimes are not the main purpose of 
audit is the fact that, e.g. Skatteverket conduct their own audits. These audits are 
independent from the work of the financial auditor, often more risk oriented and areas 
such as unreported income are reviewed.36  
3.2.1	  The	  Expectation	  Gap	  
Practitioners and textbooks may have their version of what the primary purpose of 
audit is, and this is sometimes misaligned with the perception held by society and 
businesses. Often when the public asks for audit services, they expect the auditor to 
search for fraud. If and when auditors fail to uncover fraud, it is often perceived as 
though the auditing process has failed and that the auditor is to blame. This mismatch 
is often described as the “expectation gap”, which is the gap between what the public 
expects from audit, i.e. the detection of fraud, and what auditors claim they should 
deliver.37 There are many thoughts and theories, which try to explain the underlying 
causes to the “expectation gap” phenomenon. Peter Clemedtson, the former chairman 
of FAR SRS, claims that the “expectation gap” depends on two different institutional 
factors; the statutory audit and the common framework constructed for companies 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Chandler et al. (1993)	  
32 Brown, (1962), p. 21 
33 Lee, (1986) 
34 Revisionslag 5-6§ 
35 FAR Revisionsbok, (2002), p. 14 
36 SOU, (2008) 
37 Humphrey C, et al. (1992) 
	   13	  
ranging from small to global.38 Large portions of the Swedish regulatory framework 
regarding audit are based on ISA, conceived to serve the needs and demands of large 
companies. This has led to complex and detail oriented regulations causing a collision 
between the audit processes in small and large companies.39 The lion’s share of small 
companies can be audited. The corresponding audit in large companies can only 
review a fraction of the posts, a situation contributing to the “expectation gap”. In 
Sweden, recently revealed corporate scandals have focused not on the scandals 
themselves but on the role of the auditor involved. This is thought to have further 
increased the expectation gap as this promotes the society’s view of the auditor as a 
safeguard against fraud.40 
 
There are some practitioners claiming that the “expectation gap” plays a less 
significant role in owner-managed companies than in big publicly held companies. 
This can be explained by the fact that the auditor in owner-managed companies often 
has a relatively close trust relationship with the manager/owner. This relationship 
enables the owner to participate and comprehend the audit process, thought to 
decrease the “expectation gap”.41 
 
The existence of the “expectation gap” phenomenon has led to widespread political 
demands set by society, which regard greater transparency and accountability in the 
service providing public organizations. These increased pressures in the public sector 
have resulted in the same pressures emerging into the private business area.42 In times 
of economic distress and corporate failures, politicians often blame audit in an attempt 
to dodge criticism, subsequently leading to reformations in the audit processes. The 
politicians promise stricter and intensified “codification” of the audit processes every 
time a failure occurs. This could be seen as an attempt to ensure protection against 
failure in a general fashion to a specific problem.43 At first sight the “expectation gap” 
may seem as an obstacle for politicians, but its ambiguous nature has instead made it 
a tool for politicians to use in showing the public that everything is under control.44 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Balans, (2007) 
39 Agevall & Jonegård (2013), p. 92 
40 Balans, (2007) 
41 Johansson, Häckner, Wallerstedt (2005), p. 197 
42 London Stock Exchange, (1998) 
43 Power M, (1994), p. 19 
44 ibid. p. 23 
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The outcome of the increased pressures and political agendas is a society with a sense 
of comfort and a wide set of new auditing regulations.45 
3.3	  The	  Demand	  of	  Audit	  
3.3.1	  Principal	  Agent	  Theory	  
The need to audit originates from the trust relationship between the two parties in an 
economical exchange. Human nature is assumed to be weak, untrustworthy and 
therefore needs a mechanism to maintain trust. This is especially important in cases 
where trust is not a commodity and there is a relation of accountability between the 
principal and the agent.46 As economic transactions have become larger and more 
complex, a simple handshake is insufficient in providing the trust required for a 
business deal to be upheld. Instead, an artificial trust mechanism is required.47 The 
increasingly complicated business environment distances the principal from the 
agent’s actions, thereby making it hard for the principal to verify the actions 
undertaken by the agent.48 Business owners (principals) cannot govern the entire 
organization themselves and therefore agents in form of e.g. management and 
employees are employed to act on the principals’ behalf.49 In cases where the 
principal and the agent do not have aligned interests and the agent is better informed 
than the principal, a situation of information asymmetry might emerge. The agent 
exposes the principal to moral hazard by exploiting the information asymmetry to 
make personal gains.50 Auditing is essentially a risk-reducing practice that hinders the 
possible value-reducing actions conducted by the agent, thereby benefiting the 
principal. The principal will demand audit up to the point where the marginal benefits 
tangent the marginal costs.51 Audit mainly benefits companies where the shareholders 
and management are separated and there is a wide distance between the principal and 
agent.52 
3.3.2	  Stakeholder	  Theory	  
A limited company is a separate legal entity and the owner and management of such a 
company is not personally liable for obligations that arise within it. This limited 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Power M, (1994), p. 19 
46 Flint D, (1988) 
47 Baron & Myerson, (1982) 
48 Flint D, (1988) 
49 Heery & Noon, (2008) 
50 Flint D, (1988) 
51 ibid.  
52 Artsberg K, (2005) 
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liability puts particularly high demands on the external information presented. The 
traditional view is that the external financial information is presented in the best 
interest of the share- or stockholders. The decisions made by these groups should be 
based solely on the information presented. This view is known as “shareholder 
theory”. The shareholder theory indirectly states that the shareholders of a company 
are the main stakeholders.53 This view corresponds to the Swedish Companies Act 
where it is stated that the main goal for a limited company is to allocate profits among 
the shareholders.54 
 
In Sweden, however, a new view has flourished during recent decades due to political 
pressures. It is argued that shareholders are not the only actors dependent on the 
financial information presented by the companies. Several other stakeholders rely on 
the audit statements and must also be taken into account. The shareholder theory has 
developed into a “stakeholder theory”. This new and developed view has been widely 
acknowledged by the audit profession in Sweden and the audit association FAR has 
adopted the ideas.55 
 
The Swedish Trade association for accountants, auditors and advisors FAR states that 
auditing is of great significance for a number of stakeholders. The stakeholders that 
benefit from auditing are according to FAR: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 FAR Online  
54 ABL 3:3§ 
55 Agevall & Jonegård (2013), p. 39	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Figure. 2 Stakeholder- model, small business.56 
 
The audit statements provided by the auditor are quality assured. The financial 
information serves as a basis for the stakeholders in their decision-making. When 
companies decide to opt out of audit, they force the stakeholders to conduct the 
information quality assurance process themselves.57 This situation may harm some 
stakeholders as they might lack both the resources and the means necessary. The 
statutory audit functions as a uniform system, favoring all stakeholders, independent 
of their financial situation. Creditors and tax-agencies often have the necessary 
resources, enabling them to establish their own quality assurance systems. These 
kinds of systems were, however, already prior to the abolishment of the statutory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 FAR Online 
57 ibid.  
Company	  
Owners	  • An	  auditor's	  assessement	  enables	  the	  owners	  to	  make	  informed	  decisions.	  	   Creditors	  • Serve	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  creditors'	  decision	  to	  lend	  money	  to	  a	  company.	  
Suppliers	  • The	  suppliers	  must	  be	  able	  to	  trust	  the	  companies'	  ability	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  deliveries.	  	  Board	  of	  	  Directors	  and	  CEO	  • The	  auditor	  often	  serves	  as	  a	  cinancial	  interlocutor	  for	  the	  board	  of	  directors	  and	  CEO,	  providing	  added	  value	  such	  as	  advice.	  
State	  • The	  accounting	  serves	  as	  a	  base	  for	  fees	  and	  taxes,	  to	  ensure	  error	  free	  accounting.	  An	  auditor	  also	  has	  the	  duty	  to	  report	  economic	  crime.	  
Employees	  and	  Customers	  • Trustworthy	  cinancial	  information	  is	  a	  source	  of	  information	  that	  can	  be	  valuable	  for	  both	  employees	  and	  customers.	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audit in use.58 Suppliers are the most vulnerable stakeholders due to the fact that they 
are heavily dependent on the information given to them and often lack the means to 
produce the information themselves.59 Studies conducted in the USA have shown that 
when companies opt out of audit and creditors have been forced into creating their 
own quality assurance systems, it has resulted in an increased cost of capital.60 Due to 
the fact that small companies answer to a significantly lower number of stakeholders 
in their daily operations, they do not reap the same benefits from audit as big 
companies might do. Quality-assured information is not demanded in the same extent, 
as a lower number of stakeholders require the information.61 
3.3.3	  Added	  Value	  of	  Audit	  
Audit is a service provided to companies, contributing with assurance to the 
stakeholders. The audit report is intended to give the output of assurance, rated at how 
reliable the financial statements are. The use of quality-assured information differs 
amongst stakeholders62; creditors might use it to set their credit score, investors as a 
base for investments and management for conducting business. The audit procedure 
itself is, however, a costly task. Inputs in the form of taking samples, inspecting 
assets, producing working papers etc. all come with a cost.63 The auditors’ resources 
to conduct audits are not infinite and the auditors face tradeoff choices between 
assurance levels and costs. It is the relation between the different cost inputs and the 
assurance produced that is called the added economic value of audit. When companies 
have the choice to opt out of audit, they will only demand the service in cases where 
the added economic value (the marginal benefit) is more or equal to the marginal 
cost.64 There is a correlation between the input and the assurance level but the 
measurement of the actual added economic value provided by audit is hard to ensure. 
One way of describing added economic value from a theoretical point of view is 
through the shape of a cost-assurance function. But it still remains difficult to apply it 
empirically other than in broad terms. The graph below shows that there is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Thorell P & Norberg C (2005) 
59 Johansson, Häckner, Wallerstedt (2005), p. 193 
60 Blackwell, et al. (1998) 
61 Thorell P & Norberg C (2005) 
62 CPA Australia, (2013) 
63 Hanlon G, (1994) 
64 Flint D, (1988) 
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diminishing return to audit expenditures, making it impossible to assure that 100 % of 
the financial statements reviewed are “true and fair”.65 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 The cost-assurance function for financial audit. The motion of the curve explains the diminishing 
quality returns to audit expenditures. 66 
 
 
Auditors do not know how to demonstrate their output in a good way, and instead 
auditors appeal to their expert judgment; “in the end auditors must be trusted about 
what it is they produce”.67 
3.4	  The	  Burdens	  of	  Audit	  -­‐	  The	  Audit	  Society	  
Today everything is auditable. There are, for example, financial audits, management 
audits, and environmental audits. The development today is such that society is 
striving towards a meticulous monitoring and control of activities and behavior. 
Never before have audits played such an important role. The British researcher and 
former auditor Michael Power calls the society in which we are currently living, or at 
least face living, “The Audit Society”.68 There is much evidence that Sweden is 
heading in the same direction as the UK, crumbling from the ever-increasing burdens 
of audit.69 Power’s theories are an exaggerated exposition of what society is 
becoming70 but it can nevertheless be useful in illustrating the pitfalls facing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Power M, (1997) 
66 Ibid. (1997) 
67 Ibid. (1997) 
68 Power M, (1994) 
69 Kärnborg (2011) & Sydsvenskan (2011) 
70 Humphrey & Owen (2000) 
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contemporary businesses if the prophecy of  “The Audit Society” comes true. His 
theories can be seen as an antipode to the present, generally accepted theories 
regarding the demand and purpose of audit. Maybe Power’s somewhat extreme 
opinions can serve as a piece of the puzzle in trying to understand and explain the 
deregulation process regarding financial audit currently ongoing in EU.  
3.4.1.	  Audit	  Explosion	  and	  The	  Audit	  Society	  
During the late 80’s and early 90’s, audits began to play a prominent role in society. 
An increasing number of individuals and organizations found themselves subject to 
new and more intensive accounting and auditing regulations. Power labeled this 
hunch that something systematic in society was going on beyond the traditional 
financial auditing, “The Audit Society”. To understand “The Audit Society”, it is not 
sufficient only to quantify and measure the increase in audits going on. The financial 
audit has evolved from its original concept of collecting and evaluating evidence. It 
has become more of an idea or model circulating in the institutional environment, 
used by both practitioners, executives and politicians, being blamed and praised, in 
order to regulate and reform.71 	  
3.4.2	  Consequences	  of	  The	  Audit	  Society	  
As stated earlier in the thesis the demand for audit is based on certain fundamental 
pillars, of which one is the “Principal Agent Theory”. The business environment is 
getting more complex, and the trust relationship between the principal and the agent is 
eroding, making the relationship more impersonal. Financial auditors’ services are 
today demanded mainly because of their function as a bridge between those involved 
in business, to maintain and promote the contemporary fragile trust relationship.72 
 
With trust comes risk: they depend on each other.73 A prerequisite for risk to occur is 
a relationship of trust between two or more parties.74 In reality real business risk is 
replaced with the financial risk carried by the auditor. Financial auditing risk is often 
permeated by legal risk, particularly imminent in the audit processes of large 
corporations.75 This legal risk opens up for liability exposure towards parties having a 
stake in the company and is affected by the audit conducted. This has created an audit 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Power M, (2000) 
72 Saphiro S, (1987), p. 623-58 
73 Giddens A, (1990), p. 34-35 
74 Moran M, (1986), p. 85 
75 Hawkins K, (1992), p. 275-96 
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process where everything has to be accounted and argumented in favor for, a 
defendable manner in order to protect the auditor. It is of less importance if an error 
has been made; what matters is that the audit process has been conducted in 
conjunction with the best practice of audit. In cases where liability exposure leads to 
trial, it is not the body of knowledge that is questioned; it is instead the individual 
enactment of the auditor involved. The best practice, mostly designed for large 
corporations, also heavily influences the audit processes in small companies. To 
ensure a minimum liability exposure, the best practice formed is based on the 
premises of defendability, a stance that according to Power has corroded the 
production of assurance.76 
 
The legal risk that both companies and auditors are exposed to has led to a situation 
where externally presented documents lack scope and only produce empty comfort. 
The official documents are designed to maximize the amount of discretion, thus 
increasing the defense capability of auditors. These often bland presentations have to 
some extent eroded the trustworthiness of auditors. The question that arises is if audit 
really benefit the companies and provide them with added value, or whether the 
statements only serve as certificates of approval to calm stakeholders, creating an 
artificial facade of credibility and transparency.77 The way of verifying and checking 
varies but the different processes always have one common denominator: it is always 
costly. There is uncertainty about whether companies today invest too much in these 
shallow rituals of verification at the expense of other added value activities.78 
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4.	  Pre-­‐	  Empirical	  Work	  
In this chapter a short review of the development in other countries will be made. 
Furthermore all the stated expectations on the changed legislation will be presented. Finally 
a more comprehensive table will summarize the stated expectations.  	  
A number of actors were involved in the preliminary investigations leading up to the 
changed legislation regarding statutory audit. Their opinions were spread across a 
wide spectrum and resulted in miscellaneous expectations, both positive and negative. 
The expectations of these actors were based partly on theoretical models but mainly 
on the previous expectations identified amongst other European countries that had 
already abolished their statutory audit. Two countries that were especially interesting 
to examine, due to their geographic and demographic proximity, were the UK and 
Denmark.   
4.1	  The	  Development	  in	  other	  Countries	  
4.1.1	  The	  UK	  
The UK has the ambition to be the most entrepreneurial country in the EU and strives 
to achieve this by reducing costs and lessening the administrative burdens for small 
companies. To accomplish this the government has during a 20- year period, together 
with other measures, eased the regulation regarding statutory audit.79 
 
In 1994 the UK government chose to utilize the legislation easement regarding 
statutory auditing, permitted by the Fourth Council Directive since 1978.80 The UK 
government has continuously raised the thresholds for audit exemption, and in 2008 
the threshold was compliant with the EU-maxima.81 (See Appendix I)  
 
The audit exemption legislation changes follow a strict UK regulation philosophy. 
The philosophy is based on the idea that if the benefits of a forced legislation do not 
exceed their costs they should be removed from law. The amount of legislation 
easements the UK government has implemented since 1994 indicates that the 
outcomes of the changes in regulation have been successful and have contributed to 
cost savings for small companies.82 
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A 2003 study conducted on behalf of the UK Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI), by the reputable researcher in the field Jill Collis, had the purpose of 
examining the underlying factors of small companies’ decision to opt out of audit. 
The study showed that the main reason was due to cost savings.83 Collis has 
conducted a number of interesting studies but as she has investigated factors 
contributing to the opt-out decision and not comparing expectations with outcomes, 
most of her findings are not directly applicable to this study.  
4.1.2	  Denmark	  
In 2006 the law “L50” concerning audit exemption for small companies in Denmark 
came into effect. The government's main goal with the changed legislation was to 
lessen the administrative burden for small companies by 25% by 2010 and to reduce 
costs in an attempt to increase the country’s small enterprise international 
competitiveness. At the time of implementation the thresholds were set at 
approximately the same levels Sweden would later use as their initial thresholds in 
2010, which were significantly lower than by EU allowed maxima. 75,000 Danish 
small companies were calculated to be affected by the new legislation84 (See 
Appendix I). 
 
In March 2005 a survey was conducted by Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, in which it 
was found that in a scenario where all of the affected companies were to choose audit 
opt out, it could lead to cost savings of 677 million DKK/year. Another study 
investigating the development that had taken place since the law came into place was 
conducted by the same agency in 2010. The study was based on the 74,761 companies 
eligible to opt out of audit. Out of these companies 17,104 actually chose to exempt 
their auditor. These companies corresponded to 22.8 % out of the total eligible 
companies. It was found in sampling that one third of the companies’ still chose to 
use other services provided by their previous auditor. It was calculated that the actual 
cost savings were 155-160 million DKK/year, compared to the estimated 677 million 
DKK.85 A similar development of low percentages of companies choosing to opt out 
of audit took place in the wake of the abolishment of the statutory audit in the UK. 
The UK experienced a lag-effect where a low number of companies initially chose to 	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opt out of audit, followed by an increasing number of companies opting out each year. 
These lag-effects can be explained by the lack of information both received and 
sought after by the companies affected.86  
 
Some concerns were raised regarding the possible increases in the tax gap, financial 
crime and error frequency in the financial statements.87 The Danish Tax agency found 
that there were more errors in the unaudited companies; error frequency had increased 
from 24,4% to 29,5% in the financial statements. The report, however, stated that this 
was not significantly higher and that the errors made were in many cases formalities 
and did not affect the quality of the reporting. It was also found that there was no 
increase in financial crimes since the change in legislation. Therefore, the concerns 
raised can be seen as somewhat exaggerated.88	  
4.2	  Expectations	  
4.2.1	  Cost	  Savings	  
The cost that the audit entails is both significant and burdensome for small 
companies.89 Opinions have differed regarding the annual cost reduction a company 
would enjoy from being exempted from the statutory audit. The Swedish government 
estimated that before the bill was passed, a small company spent 15 000 SEK/year. 
However, Svenskt Näringsliv made another estimate, their findings showed that the 
cost of audit for a small company was approximately 10 000 SEK/year. This number 
excluded the estimated cost savings made from the lessened administrative cost 
burdens. Svenskt Näringsliv concluded that the total annual anticipated cost savings 
per year would amount to approximately 2 billion SEK, to be compared to the 
somewhat higher cost reduction of 2,8 billion SEK per year estimated by the Swedish 
government.90 
 
In practice a distinction between audit and consultations services in small companies 
is not easily made. Even though the auditor is recruited to review already finished 
accounting and financial statements, the auditor more than often functions as a 
consultant helping the company correct deficiencies in the accounting. The 	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government anticipated that the abolishment of statutory audit would lead to small 
companies having to compensate these lost elements in other ways, often in the form 
of other complimentary services, resulting in alternative costs.91 The audit and 
accounting industry foresaw this development and intensified the development of 
alternative services even before the changed legislation was in place. It was 
anticipated by Företagarna that increased competition for audit related services would 
lead to a wider range of services with lower prices.92   
 
A general assumption made by audit practitioners is that another alternative cost, in 
the form of increased cost of capital, might arise due to an abolishment of the auditor. 
Banks and creditors might have to increase the use of their own quality assurance 
systems or suffer the loss of lower financial statement quality, forcing them to 
increase the interest rates to compensate for this loss.93  
4.2.2	  Lessened	  Administrative	  Burdens	  
One of the most stated expectations that came with the change in legislation regarding 
the statutory audit was that the new legislation, as part of a more extensive package of 
measure, would lessen the administrative burdens by as much as 25 %.94 It was 
assumed that a reduction of the administrative burdens would lessen companies’ 
administrative costs on average by 5000 SEK, a change that could save a total of 0,6 
billion SEK/year for the companies.95 
 
The correlation between administrative burdens and costs is high in organizations. 
Assignments that are time-consuming are almost always costly. However, it is 
important to distinguish between the costs that are directly related to the audit, and the 
peripheral costs that come with the handling of the audit. When speaking of the term 
administrative burdens from a company´s point of view, it does not refer to the direct 
costs of audit. Instead it refers to the peripheral costs surrounding the audit process, 
i.e. the costs that companies are ultimately forced to bear.96 
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Skatteverket has raised concerns regarding an increase in financial crime rates, 
especially tax fraud. They believed that an abolished statutory audit drastically would 
increase the incentive of financial crimes as well as a reduced tax moral. This 
expectation would not have any direct economic consequences for the companies. 
However, additional costs in the form of enhanced tax controls could occur, 
additional costs that were thought to add to the overall administrative cost burdens of 
companies.97  
4.2.3	  Fitted	  Services	  
Advocates of an abolishment of the statutory audit clearly maintain that it is not the 
audit itself that they are opposing; it is mainly the fact that the audit is statutory. A 
company that benefits from the audit service will still demand it, although instead on 
a voluntary basis.98 Acquiring the audit services on a voluntary basis would enable 
companies to better choose the best fitted services for their type of company. This is 
instead of being subject to complex and wide spanning rules and regulations, 
constructed and designed mainly for large corporations.99 
 
A more customized range of services, as a result of the changed legislation, were 
according to the chairman of FAR, Peter Clemedtson, expected to decrease the 
expectation gap. This is because companies were allowed to freely choose and adapt 
their range of accounting and auditing services to the most adequate combinations.100 
4.2.4	  Global	  Competitiveness	  	  
By lessening the administrative burdens it was thought that Swedish small companies 
global competitiveness would be strengthened. Both the Swedish investigation and 
Svenskt Näringsliv considered that the cost that the audit entails is both significant 
and burdensome for small companies.101 A statutory audit requirement has, according 
to the association Företagarna, also led to that Swedish companies have been unable 
to tailor the services they demand.102 This has resulted in that Swedish small 
companies have had a disadvantage in comparison to similar companies in the 
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European Union. With an abolishment of the statutory audit the competitiveness of 
small Swedish companies is suggested to have increased.103  
 
There are proponents claiming that the opposite is true. FAR´s opinion is that the 
statutory audit in Sweden that spans across every Swedish company is a unique 
phenomenon that benefits the Swedish market. Instead of being a burden for these 
companies, it functions as a competitive advantage towards other European 
companies, and ensures that every company maintains high quality in their 
accounting. The requirements imposed on the Swedish auditors by law are designed 
in a way that have contributed to ensure and maintain the high quality accounting that 
Swedish companies are known for.104  
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4.3	  Table	  of	  Expectations	  
Based on the pre- empirical work of expectations the following table was developed, 
mapping the perceived expectations to the specific questions of the web survey. 
Anticipated effects from opting out of audit 
Effects on Swedish micro companies after  
the change in auditing regulations 
Cost Savings Reference Question 
Nr. 
Underlying 
Theories 
+Estimated cost reduction by 10 000 SEK 
per company from saving on auditing 
services.  
Svenskt Näringsliv  15, 16, 3 Audit society/Added Economic 
Value/ Stakeholder 
+ Estimated cost reduction by 15 000 
SEK from saving on auditing services 
SOU (2008:32) 15, 16, 3 Audit society/Added Economic 
Value/ Stakeholder 
+Total savings for Swedish companies of 
2 billion SEK 
 
Svenskt Näringsliv  15, 16, 3 Audit society/Added Economic 
Value/ Stakeholder 
+Total savings for Swedish companies of 
2.8 billion SEK 
SOU (2008:32) 15, 16, 3 Audit society/Added Economic 
Value/ Stakeholder 
- Alternative costs in form of auditing and 
consulting services 
 
+ Wider range of alternative services 
SOU (2008:32) 
 
Företagarna 
8, 9 
 
11 
Added Economic Value 
- 
+ Lower price of alternative services Företagarna 12 - 
- Increased cost of capital Svenskt Näringsliv 13 Stakeholder 
Administrative Costs 
+Administrative burdens lessened SOU (2008:32) 6 Principal agent theory 
+Annual cost reduction 5000 SEK Svenskt Näringsliv  - 
- An increase in visitations from 
Skatteverket, which is accompanied by 
higher administrative costs 
 
FAR SRS (ECON) 
 
 
17 The Purpose of Audit 
Fitted Services   
Expectation Gap Peter Clemendtsson 7 Expectation gap 
+ Better fitted services Företagarna  10 Expectation gap 
Global Competitiveness    
+ Increased competitiveness on a global 
market 
SOU (2008:32) & FAR 4, 5 Audit Society 	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5.	  Empirical	  Presentation/Analysis	  
In this chapter the findings of the survey will be presented. A discussion on why business 
owners perceive the expectations the way they do will also be made.  
5.1	  Response	  Rates	  
	   	  Surveys	  Dispatched	  	   1100	  
Number	  of	  respondents	   197	  Response	  rate	  	   17,90%	  	  
The number of respondents amounted to 197, which was above the sample size 
required, with a total response rate of 17,90%. There is always a risk of low response 
rates when using web-based surveys. It is therefore hard to estimate a reasonable 
response rate. This thesis’ response rate of 17,90% is, however, well above the 
response rate suggested for this type of survey by Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill’s, 
who estimate an acceptable response rate of 11%.105  
5.2	  Number	  of	  Owners	  	  
Number	  of	  owners Count 
1 134 
2 47 
3 6 
4 3 
5 3 
6 1 
Average	  number	  of	  owners	   1,4  
Owner Table: shows the number of owners in the responding companies  
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5.3	  Cost	  Savings	  
5.3.1	  Cost	  Reduction	  
	  
Has the choice of opting out of audit (despite employing other complementary services) led to 
cost reductions? 
+	  Cost	  Reduction	  
Question	   Median	   Match/Mismatch	  
15	   5	   Match	  
Respondents	   Strongly	  
Disagree	  
Disagree	   Unchanged	   Agree	   Strongly	  	  Agree	  
Missing/	  
No	  
opinion	  Count:	   7	   1	   14	   28	   113	   34	  Percentage:	   4,3	  %	   0,6	  %	   8,6	  %	   17,2	  %	   69,3%	   -­‐	  
 
  
Most advocates of an abolishment of the statutory audit were united in their view that 
the changed legislation would lead to significant cost reductions for companies opting 
out of audit. The amount of cost reduction each company would enjoy was, however, 
disputed, ranging from 10-15 000 SEK/year, and expected to amount in total cost 
savings up to 2,8 billion SEK for all Swedish companies combined. This study 
indicates a clear match between the expectations about the abolishment leading to 
cost reduction and the actual outcome perceived by the surveyed companies. It is 
evident that the majority of companies that have chosen to opt out of audit consider 
their decision to be economically beneficial. However, to calculate the cost savings 
made in exact numbers is difficult, as noted by the different calculations made in 
connection to the legislative proposition. This may explain why 34 of the respondents 
either skipped the question or had no opinion on the matter. Companies may 
experience difficulties in calculating their own cost savings. The survey limits the 
respondent’s ability to issue an accurate answer as the options given are divided into 
specified intervals.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   30	  
6,	  06%	  
18,	  18%	  
19,	  39%	  
22,	  42%	  
33,	  94%	   0-­‐2000	  2000-­‐5000	  5000-­‐7500	  7500-­‐10000	  >	  10000	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Demonstrates the total amounted costs savings companies have made each year since the 
changed legislation. Question 16. 
 
Approximately 34 % of the responding companies estimate cost saving of more than 
10 000 SEK/ year. To be able to compare and analyze the data, and due to the survey 
limitation mentioned above, an assumption is made that the companies targeted in the 
> 10 000 SEK/ year interval also saved this exact amount. When adopting this 
assumption, the average cost savings made by all companies in the study amount to 
7265 SEK/ year per company.106 This number is more aligned with the estimations 
made by Svenskt Näringsliv, who predicted cost savings of 10 000 SEK/year, than 
that of SOU, whose corresponding estimation was 15 000 SEK.107 Note, however, 
that due to the interval limitations of the study, the total amount saved by the 
companies might be higher than the calculations show.   
 
When the lowest possible number was used for > 10 000 SEK cost savings interval, 
the total cost savings was calculated to be 1,4 billion SEK, slightly lower than 
expected.108 It is, however, possible that the estimated cost savings expected are 
accurate, if the companies cost savings in the > 10 000 SEK strata are on average 
higher than the number used in this study.  
 
The UK and Denmark experienced lag-effects that hindered companies from taking 
full advantage of the changed legislation, reducing the possible cost savings. The 
same tendencies are not, according to this study, as substantial in Sweden as observed 
in the UK and Denmark.109  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Appendix II 
107 SOU, (2008) & Thorell P & Norberg C (2005) 
108 Appendix II 
109 Collis, (2003) 
	   31	  
The companies, just like auditors, are faced with a trade- off between quality-assured 
information and the costs it entails. Companies will choose audit only in those cases 
where the marginal benefit exceeds the marginal cost. The study clearly indicates that 
small companies in Sweden do not perceive the marginal benefits necessary to justify 
the audit costs and therefore have chosen to opt out of audit. The “Cost assurance 
function” shows a diminishing marginal benefit of audit. 34 % of the respondents 
claim they saved more than 10 000 SEK/year which could indicate that the 
experienced marginal benefit of each SEK spent on audit is relatively low.110  
 
What causes these non-perceived marginal benefits? Power raises concerns about 
whether audit in its entirety adds economic value to companies. He claims that audit 
today has created a best practice where the companies’ best interests are not always in 
focus. Instead the focus of audit has become to create audit processes that can easily 
be vindicated in an attempt to minimize the auditors’ liability exposure. Companies 
might experience that the service no longer provides the added economic value it is 
intended to. This could also explain why small companies have chosen to opt out of 
audit and hence been able to reduce their costs. The companies may perceive the 
auditors’ statements as nothing more than certificates of approval to calm 
stakeholders, providing statements that lack scope and produce nothing but empty 
comfort.111 
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Table 2: Demonstrates which stakeholders the respondents perceive as most important. Several options 
were eligible. Question 3.  
 
The most important stakeholders are owners and customers.112 A vast majority of the 
companies affected by the changed legislation only consist of one to two owners113 
and these owners often have full insight in daily operations. Small companies where 
owner and management are the same do not benefit from audit as much as big 
corporations, for whom major parts of the audit regulatory framework are intended to 
serve. This can lead to situations where the information presented to companies may 
seem redundant, as stakeholders highly regarded by the companies do not demand 
it.114   
 
Regardless of whether companies perceive audit to be beneficial or not, it always 
becomes a matter of costs. Since the companies have chosen to opt out of audit, they 
seem to believe that the money previously spent on audit is better used on other value-
adding economic activities.115  
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23,	  7%	  
76,	  3%	  
Yes	  No	  
5.3.2	  Alternative	  Costs	  of	  Complementary	  Services	  
	  
	  
Have complementary services been utilized in order to replace functions 
previously provided by the auditor? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: shows the proportion of companies utilizing complementary services. Question 8.  
 
In the government investigation prior to the change in legislation, concerns were 
raised that companies choosing to opt out of audit would lose the professional 
expertise provided by the auditor. It was thought that costly complementary services 
would have to fill the void left by the absence of the auditor.116 When examining the 
empirical data, it is observed that the concerns raised by the government investigation 
were partially correct. ¼ of the companies surveyed have contracted complementary 
services.  	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Table 4: Demonstrates which complementary services the respondents who answered, “yes” in table 3 
have employed. Question 9. 
 
The most requested services among these companies are accounting and advisory 
services. These services are to a large extent similar to those the auditor previously 
might have assisted with when active.117 The majority of the companies in the study 
have, however, chosen not to employ complementary services. Companies that 
choose to lay off their auditor might not recognize the added economic value lost 
from this decision. It is hard to describe the added economic value of audit, other than 
in broad theoretical terms. This poses a problem, not only to companies missing out 
on added economic value, but also to the audit profession as it may lack the ability to 
showcase its its output. Auditors have to be able to make companies trust their expert 
judgment; otherwise it might lead to companies excluding the service.118 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Table 4 
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5.3.3	  Range	  and	  Price	  of	  Complementary	  Services	  
	  
Has the supply of complementary services increased since the abolishment of the statutory 
audit? 
+Increased	  supply	  of	  complement-­‐ary	  services	  
Question	   Median	   Match/Mismatch	  
11	   4	   Match	  
Respondents	   Strongly	  
Disagree	  
Disagree	   Unchanged	   Agree	   Strongly	  	  Agree	  
Missing/	  
No	  
opinion	  Count:	   4	   1	   39	   46	   11	   96	  Percentage:	   4	  %	   1	  %	   38,6	  %	   45,5	  %	   10,9	  %	   -­‐	  	  	  
Have the prices on complementary services decreased since the abolishment of the statutory 
audit? 
+Decreased	  price	  on	  complement-­‐ary	  services	  
Question	   Median	   Match/Mismatch	  
12	   3	   Mismatch	  
Respondents	   Strongly	  
Disagree	  
Disagree	   Unchanged	   Agree	   Strongly	  	  Agree	  
Missing/	  
No	  
opinion	  Count:	   15	   15	   41	   25	   16	   85	  Percentage:	   13,4	  %	   13,4	  %	   36,6	  %	   22,3	  %	   14,3	  %	   -­‐	  
 
 
The new legislation was expected to lead to harshened competition between audit 
bureaus. It was thought that the new competition would lead to a wider range of 
services followed by a price reduction.119 The study indicates a match in wider range 
of services but a mismatch regarding the expected price reductions. It is, however, 
important to note that in both questions a large proportion of the respondents did not 
answer, or had no opinion on the matter. This may be due to the fact that many 
companies did not choose to employ complementary services and therefore could not 
form an opinion about the new market situation.120  
 
The audit firms were proactive to the change in legislation and adapted their range of 
services to fit their clients’ new requirements, which may serve as an explanation as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 FAR SRS Info, (2008) 
120 Table 4 
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to why the companies have experienced a wider range of services. The companies are 
no longer bound by generic audit solutions and this has forced auditing firms to be 
innovative and customize their services to create solutions that better fit the new 
needs of their clients.121  
5.3.4	  Cost	  of	  Capital	  
Has opting out of audit led to an increased cost of capital?	  
-­‐	  Increased	  Cost	  of	  Capital	  
Question	   Median	   Match/Mismatch	  
13	   1	   Mismatch	  
Respondents	   Strongly	  
Disagree	  
Disagree	   Unchanged	   Agree	   Strongly	  	  Agree	  
Missing/	  
No	  
opinion	  Count:	   86	   10	   52	   13	   6	   30	  Percentage:	   51,5	  %	   6	  %	   31,1	  %	   7,8	  	  %	   3,6	  	  %	   -­‐	  
 
Before the change in legislation took place, several advocates raised concerns that the 
new regulations could lead to increased cost of capital, in similarity to other 
countries.122 The abolishment of the statutory audit was suggested to lead to 
deteriorating financial statement quality, forcing banks and creditors to increase 
interest rates in order to compensate for greater risk.123 A clear mismatch between the 
expectation of increased cost of capital and the views of companies could, however, 
be observed in the study.  
 
One way to explain this observation is to examine the working processes of banks and 
creditors. These institutions had in most cases already prior to the change in 
legislation adopted their own quality assurance systems or alternatively initiated 
collaborations with credit agencies. Therefore, the impact on banks and creditors was 
not as harsh as expected, leaving the cost of capital intact.124 The fact that only 6 out 
of 195125 respondents were of the opinion that creditors are one of their most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Balans, (2007) 
122 Blackwell, et al. (1998) 
123 Thorell P & Norberg C (2005) 
124 ibid.  
125 Table 3  
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important stakeholders supports the theory of banks and creditors being able to supply 
themselves with the information necessary.126 
 
5.4	  Administrative	  Costs 	  
Has time spent on administrative work decreased?	  
+	  Time	  spent	  on	  administrati-­‐ve	  work	  has	  decreased	  
Question	   Median	   Match/Mismatch	  
6	   3	   Mismatch	  
Respondents	   Strongly	  
Disagree	  
Disagree	   Unchanged	   Agree	   Strongly	  	  Agree	  
Missing/	  
No	  
opinion	  Count:	   25	   10	   97	   31	   18	   16	  Percentage:	   13,8	  %	   5,5	  %	   53,6	  %	   17,1	  	  %	   9,9	  	  %	   -­‐	  
 
 
The Swedish government considered the administrative pressure on Swedish 
companies to be far too great. The government stated that an abolishment of the 
statutory audit could lessen these burdens by as much as 25 %. It was also anticipated 
that it could lead to additional cost savings of 5000 SEK/year per company, directly 
related to the lessened administrative burdens.127 The study shows that companies 
have not experienced lessened administrative burdens. The outcome indicates a 
mismatch. It should, however, be noted that there is a strong correlation between costs 
referable to administrative burdens and the total cost savings made, which makes it 
hard to distinguish administrative cost savings from others.128  
 
The essence of audit is its risk-reducing function, which hinders companies from 
participating in value-reducing actions. As companies choose to opt out of audit they 
lose the control and risk-reducing function that the auditor previously provided. When 
the control function is removed, the companies alone have to prevent value-reducing 
actions and shoulder the former duties conducted by the auditor. The shift of duties 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Thorell P & Norberg C (2005)	  
127 SOU 2008:32 
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from the auditor to the companies may explain why the perceived experience 
regarding lessened administrative burdens has not been as prominent as expected.129 
 
 
Have the visitations of Skatteverket increased, leading to more administrative work?	  
-­‐	  The	  visitations	  from	  Skatteverket	  have	  increased	  
Question	   Median	   Match/Mismatch	  
17	   3	   Mismatch	  
Respondents	   Strongly	  
Disagree	  
Disagree	   Unchanged	   Agree	   Strongly	  	  Agree	  
Missing/	  
No	  
opinion	  Count:	   70	   2	   87	   4	   1	   33	  Percentage:	   42,7	  %	   1,2	  %	   53	  %	   2,4	  	  %	   0,6	  	  %	   -­‐	  
 
Both Skatteverket and BFR were concerned that when the statutory audit was 
abolished this would lead to an increase in economic crimes. It was feared that 
Skatteverket would have to act in order to prevent the expected development and that 
the number of unexpected visitations would increase, entailing new administrative 
pressures on companies.130 The empirical data, however, disproves this expectation 
and the outcome indicates a mismatch. Prior to the statutory audit abolishment in 
Denmark, the same concerns were raised. Studies conducted in Denmark stated that 
the economic crime rate only marginally increased and that the crimes detected often 
regarded small misdemeanors, not affecting the validity of the financial statements.131  
 
Because it has been established that fraud detection is not the main purpose of audit, 
Skatteverket has not been able to blindly trust the assumption that criminal activities 
are not occurring, even if the auditor in a company has given his/her approval and 
provided a clean audit statement.132 Regardless of whether the financial statements 
have been audited or not, Skatteverket already conducted independent audits prior to 
the abolishment. Evidently these audits were sufficient in fulfilling the purpose of 
detecting financial crimes, thus explaining why the companies have not experienced 
an increase in visitations from Skatteverket.133  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 ibid.  
130 ECON, (2007) 
131 Collis, (2003) 
132 Revisionslag 5-6§ 
133 SOU 2008:32, p.257	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5.5	  Fitted	  Services 	  
Before opting out of audit, did you consider the auditor to conduct the services expected?	  
The	  auditor	  conducted	  the	  expected	  services	  	  
Question	   Median	   Match/Mismatch	  
7	   4	   Match	  
Respondents	   Strongly	  
Disagree	  
Disagree	   Unchanged	   Agree	   Strongly	  	  Agree	  
Missing/	  
No	  
opinion	  Count:	   20	   35	   25	   31	   70	   16	  Percentage:	   11	  %	   19,3	  %	   13,8	  %	   17,1	  	  %	   38,7	  	  %	   -­‐	  
 	  
An expectation was that of a decreased “expectation gap” as an effect of the 
abolishment of the statutory audit.134 In order to test whether the expectation was met, 
it had to be concluded if the respondents actually experienced an expectation gap 
prior to the changed legislation. The match observed above indicates that the 
respondents prior to the changed legislation did not experience an “expectation gap”.  
 
The occurrence of an “expectation gap” is often explained by the misconception 
regarding the expected role of an auditor. A business owner often lives in the false 
belief that an audit’s primary objective is to detect fraud when in reality it is quality 
assurance of the financial information. Some practitioners, however, accentuate the 
fact that the “expectation gap” is not as prevalent amongst the owners of small 
companies. The close relationship between the business owner and the auditor often 
makes it possible for the owner to have full insight in the auditing process, prohibiting 
the emergence of an expectation gap. This might serve as one explanation as to why 
the majority of the surveyed companies did not experience an “expectation gap”.135  
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Are these services now better aligned with your expectations?	  
+These	  services	  are	  now	  better	  aligned	  with	  expectations	  	  
Question	   Median	   Match/Mismatch	  
10	   5	   Match	  
Respondents	   Strongly	  
Disagree	  
Disagree	   Unchanged	   Agree	   Strongly	  	  Agree	  
Missing/	  
No	  
opinion	  Count:	   1	   0	   9	   8	   24	   3	  Percentage:	   2,4	  %	   0	  %	   21,4	  %	   19	  	  %	   57,1	  	  %	   -­‐	  
* The respondents who answered, “yes” on the question: “Complementary services has been utilized 
in order to replace functions previously provided by the auditor?” were the only respondents eligible 
to answer question number 10, hence the low number of respondents.136  
 
 
It was anticipated that a potential expectation gap would decrease with an increase in 
the range of complementary services. The factors contributing to a decreased 
expectation gap were agreed to depend on the fact that companies would be able to 
tailor the services demanded to fit better in line with their expectations and needs.137 
The study indicates that the complementary services utilized now are better aligned 
with the companies’ expectations: a match is observed which may be explained by the 
fact that companies experience the range of services having increased, providing them 
with better fitted services.138 
 
Logically it is hard to explain how companies did not perceive an expectation gap 
prior to the changed legislation but still claim a better fit afterwards. An explanation 
to this phenomenon could, however, be found in the statement of Peter Clemendtson, 
former chairman of FAR, who states that the “expectation gap” can be derived from 
the fact that the audit has been statutory. When companies today employ an auditor or 
a complementary service, it is done so on a voluntary basis. The companies are 
involved in the entire process, stating their own expectations of the service demanded. 
Obviously, this contributes in making the services chosen more aligned with the 
expectations designed by the companies themselves.139  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Table 3 
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27,	  40%	  
72,	  60%	  
Yes	  No	  
5.6	  Global	  Competitiveness	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: showing the percentage of companies currently operating on a global market. Question 4.  
 
Has the global competitiveness of your company increased due to opting out of audit?	  
+Global	  competitiveness	  has	  increased	  	  
Question	   Median	   Match/Mismatch	  
5	   3	   Mismatch	  
Respondents	   Strongly	  
Disagree	  
Disagree	   Unchanged	   Agree	   Strongly	  	  Agree	  
Missing/	  
No	  
opinion	  Count:	   11	   3	   27	   5	   3	   5	  Percentage:	   22,4	  %	   6,1	  %	   55,1	  	  %	   10,2	  	  %	   6,1%	   -­‐	  
* The respondents who answered, “yes” on the question: “Do you operate on a global market?” were the only respondents 
eligible to answer question number 5, hence the low number of respondents.140 
 
One declared expectation prior to the change in legislation was that Swedish small 
companies would, due to the abolishment of the statutory audit, benefit from an 
increase in their global competitiveness. By cost savings and better fitted services the 
global competitiveness was supposed to increase.141 The companies have experienced 
both cost savings and better tailored services142 but there is still an observed 
mismatch, with the majority of companies stating their global competiveness to be 
“unchanged”.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Table 5 
141 SOU 2008:32 & Thorell P & Norberg C (2005) 
142 Table 1 & Question 10 
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FAR considered the high quality assurance standards entailed by the statutory audit to 
be a competitive advantage, inconsistent with the views of the proponents. Maybe it is 
this fact that caused the respondents to see no increase in their global 
competitiveness.143  
 
It is, however, important to note that only approximately 27 % of the companies 
surveyed actually operated on a global market. The eased regulations and the benefits 
entailed were all supposed to result in an increased competitiveness towards countries 
where these simplifications had already been implemented. This political approach to 
increasing the global competitiveness can be seen as rather ineffective since such a 
small proportion of the companies are affected by the changed legislation. 144    
 
The study rejects the notion that global competitiveness has increased. By applying 
Power’s theory of audit as a model circulating in the institutional environment, both 
the underlying philosophy to the expectations of the changed legislation, as well as 
the outcome may be explained. Power argues that audit is no longer solely a service 
performed on behalf of the companies but has evolved into an idea circulating in 
today’s society, an idea, both blamed and praised, used as a tool by politicians. 
Politicians use audit regulations to show the public that they actively strive for a 
better business climate. Of great importance is which impression the politicians give 
by conducting the promised politics: the actual outcome is irrelevant. Prior to the 
change in legislation, audit was blamed for restraining small companies acting on a 
global market. By removing these restraints, politicians were portrayed as energetic 
and decisive, despite the fact that the changed legislation, according to this study, has 
had no real impact in the companies affected. 145 
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  stakeholders	  demanded	  the	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5.7	  Overall	  Impression	  
 
 
Are you satisfied with the decision to opt out of audit?	  
+Satisfied	  with	  the	  decisions	  to	  opt	  out	  of	  audit	  	  
Question	   Median	   Match/Mismatch	  
20	   5	   Match	  
Respondents	   Strongly	  
Disagree	  
Disagree	   Unchanged	   Agree	   Strongly	  	  Agree	  
Missing/	  
No	  
opinion	  Count:	   2	   5	   20	   14	   143	   13	  Percentage:	   1,1	  %	   2,7	  %	   10,9	  	  %	   7,6	  	  %	   77,7%	   -­‐	  
 
The intended purpose with the regulation regarding voluntary audit was to promote 
the Swedish business climate, in an increasingly competitive Europe.146 78 % of the 
respondents did “strongly agree” with the statement. The median value was 5, thus 
indicating a match.  
 
Which factors can explain why companies to such a large extent experienced their 
decision to opt out of audit as favorable? In order to answer this question it is 
necessary to state the factors contributing to the opt-out decision.  
 
What/which of the following statements led to the decision to opt out of audit? 	   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Companies’ main reasons for opting out of audit 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  146	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In accordance to the UK development, the respondents claim the main reason for 
opting out of audit to be the observed cost savings put in relation to the experienced 
benefits from audit.147 148A great number of respondents also stated that the auditor 
did not provide any real value to the company. Audit is sprung from needs that occur 
due to the problems following a principal-agent relationship, often prominent in large 
and complex corporations. In the regulatory framework surrounding auditing, little 
consideration has been noted concerning the fact that small companies often do not 
operate under these circumstances.149 When the preconditions of principal-agent issue 
do not exist, neither does the demand for audit. Under the pressure of statutory audit 
and the preconditions which legitimize the demand, the companies have been forced 
into utilizing a service, which does not always provide them with real value.150  
 
The main purpose of audit is to ensure the quality of financial statement, allowing 
stakeholders to make rational decisions based on the information provided. However, 
some respondents claimed that one of the reasons for opting out of audit was that the 
stakeholders did not demand the financial information presented.151 The audit process 
is from a company point of view costly, and if no stakeholder demands the assured 
information, the service becomes redundant.152 There are in some cases stakeholders 
demanding the assured information but the costs entailed by audit might cause 
companies to experience a marginal benefit less than the marginal costs. The 
companies may have difficulties measuring the benefits provided by audit in a 
sufficient manner.153  
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  company's	  cinances	  
Do you consider yourselves to be missing out on added economic values due to 
the decision of opting out of audit? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: demonstrates if companies’ perceived any added value losses due to the decision to opt out of 
audit 
 
The results are striking. Approximately 90 % of the respondents have not experienced 
any loss in added value due to their decision.154 This result can indicate one of two 
things: either the companies did not feel that the auditor provided any added values, 
or the fact that measuring added value provided is difficult, causing the respondents to 
not perceive the value of audit. The overall satisfaction from the respondents on their 
decision to opt out of audit may point to the fact that their views are consistent with 
Power’s description of the society evolving into an “Audit Society”, a society where 
the frequent use of audit as more of an idea than its actual intended purpose has 
corroded the profession, causing it to lose its legitimacy towards the small business 
owners. Maybe there could be some truth to Power’s suggestive ideas of a society 
crumbling from the pressure of ever increasing audit. Companies affected by these 
pressures can be relieved from their burdens by a decrease in the regulatory 
framework.155  
 
There is currently a counter movement going on that opposes the audit professions’ 
dictating forces that affect the daily operations of small companies. The auditors have 
to prove that the service, which for so long has been a vital part of both society and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Table 7 
155 Humphrey & Owen (2000) 
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business, still provides companies with added value and promotes commerce of all 
kinds.156  
6.	  Conclusion	  
In this final chapter a discussion based on the problem statement will be presented regarding 
the thesis findings. In the end thoughts about future research will be presented.  	  
Prior to the change in legislation regarding the statutory audit many expectations were 
stated, both positive and negative, all having different views on what the outcomes 
would be. In hope of being able to influence the design of the new legislation, all 
actors had different agendas when stating their expectations, making them somewhat 
biased in an attempt to highlight the expectations important to the representatives of 
each actor. This study becomes interesting as it has combined all of these biased 
expectations and investigated the outcome for which the changed legislation 
ultimately governs, the small companies. All the stated expectations were not matched 
with the outcomes but the overall impression of this study suggests that the initiative 
has been successful in promoting small companies. The changed regulation has in 
comparison to other European countries quickly gained ground and on the 2nd of 
February 2014 there were 194 833 companies that had chosen to opt out of audit, 85% 
of the companies eligible.  
 
The generally accepted economic theories seems inadequate in describing the purpose 
and the benefits of audit for small companies, as the theories to a large extent are 
based on the premises of phenomena often occurring in big and complex 
organizations. The study shows that neither principal- agent nor expectation gap 
problems are prevalent, and the fact that small companies answer to only a few 
number of stakeholders also makes the stakeholder theory somewhat inapplicable. 
The wide spanning, complex, regulatory framework is constructed to fit the needs of 
bigger companies, and the fact that 78 % of the companies “strongly agreed” with the 
statement: “You are satisfied with the decision to opt out of audit”, indicates that the 
audit regulations have become a burden too heavy for small companies to bear. This 
is further confirmed by the notion that the majority of the surveyed companies have 
experienced cost savings.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 Power M, (1997)	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The development of society into an audit society might have corroded audit, making it 
nothing but shallow rituals of verification. The overall compliance with the change in 
legislation where 90 % of the companies surveyed did not consider missing out on 
any added value when opting out of audit, can be seen as a countermovement to the 
Audit society. However, it can be observed in the study that there still are companies 
that have chosen to employ complementary services, services that to a large extent are 
similar to the services previously performed by the auditor. The auditors’ expertise is 
apparently demanded and in some way adding value to the company. To measure the 
output of audit is difficult and maybe it is the lack of auditors’ ability to showcase the 
added value contributed that have caused the companies to opt out of audit. The 
responsibility of re establishing the trustworthiness and legitimacy now lies in the 
hands of the audit profession itself to prove their services still contribute to business. 
  
6.1	  Further	  Discussion	  
The development in other European countries that have chosen to relax their 
regulations regarding audit is similar to that of Sweden. All of these countries have 
found that the initiative has been successful and the thresholds for audit exemption 
have gradually been raised. This study shows that the abolishment of the statutory 
audit in Sweden, from a small company’s perspective, has been successful. Due to the 
successful outcome it would be interesting to see if it is possible for Sweden to further 
raise the current low thresholds, to a level more aligned with other European 
countries.  	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Appendix	  I	  
 
EU maxima thresholds  
• Total assets: 4 400 000 € 
• Net turnover: 8 800 000 € 
• Number of employees: 50 
 
 
Swedish translation to EU maxima 
• Total assets: > 41 500 000 SEK 
• Net turnover: > 83 000 000 SEK 
• Number of employees: 50 
 
Swedish thresholds 
• Total assets: > 1 500 000 SEK 
• Net turnover: > 3 000 000 SEK 
• Number of employees: 3 
 
UK thresholds, 2008 
• Total assets: > 3 260 000 £ 
• Net turnover: > 6 500 000 £ 
• Employees: > 50 
Denmark thresholds, 2006 
• Total assets: > 1 500 000 DKK 
• Net turnover: > 3 000 000 DKK 
• Employees: > 12 
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Appendix	  II Sample	  size	  
 𝑛 = 𝑝%  ×  𝑞%  ×    𝑧𝑒% ! 
where 
n is the minimum sample size needed 
p% is the proportion belonging to the specified category* 
q% is the proportion not belonging to the specified category* 
z is the z value corresponding to the level of confidence required  
e% is the margin of error required. 
 𝑛 =   50×  50  ×    1,966 ! 
 𝑛 = 189 
 
*: Proportion unknown, therefore 50 % is used as an estimation of proportion belonging to the 
specified group.157  
 
Average cost savings 
n= number of respondents 
Y= total cost savings 
The middle-number of the interval is used. 
 
Y=(10x1000) + (30x3500) + (32x6250) + (37x8750) + (56x10000)/165 
Y=7265 
 
Total cost savings 
 𝑌 = 𝑦  ×  𝑧 
where 
Y= total cost savings 
y= average cost savings 
z= number of companies that have chosen to opt out of audit 
 𝑌 = 7265  ×  87291 
 𝑌 = 634  169  115 SEK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Saunders, Lewis, Thornhill, (2007) 
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Appendix	  III	  	  
	  
Question	  1	  
	  
How	  many	  employees	  does	  your	  company	  have?	  	  
Number	  of	  employees Count 
0 26 
1 90 
2 43 
3 13 
4 3 
5> 15 
Average	  number	  of	  employees	     	  	  
Question	  2:	  	  	  
How	  many	  owners	  does	  your	  company	  have?	  	  
Number	  of	  owners Count 
1 134 
2 47 
3 6 
4 3 
5 3 
6 1 
Average	  number	  of	  owners	   1,4  
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Question	  3:	  
	  
Which	  stakeholders	  are	  the	  most	  important	  to	  your	  company?	  	  
	  
Question	  4:	  	  
Is	  your	  company	  currently	  active	  on	  a	  global	  market?	  
	   YES	   NO	  54	   143	  	  	  
Respondents	  
Strongly	  
disagree	  
Disagree	   Unchanged	  
Agree	  
Strongly	  
disagree	  
No	  opinion	  
Question 5:  
Has the global competitiveness of your company increased due to opting out of audit?	  
Count:	   11 3 27 5 3 5	  
	  Percentage	   22,4% 6,1% 55,1% 10,2% 6,1% -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Question 6: 
Has time spent on administrative work decreased?	  
Count:	   25 10 97 31 18 12	  
Percentage	   13,8% 5,5% 53,6% 17,1% 9,9% -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
6	   13	  
1	   19	  
6	   150	  
107	  
0	   20	   40	   60	   80	   100	   120	   140	   160	  Other	  
Skatteverket	  Government	  
Suppliers	  Creditors	  
Customers	  Owners	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Question 7: 
Before opting out of audit, did you consider the auditor to conduct the services expected?	  
Count:	   20 35 25 31 70 10	  
Percentage:	   11,0% 19,3% 13,8% 17,1% 38,7% -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
 
 
Question 8: 
Have complementary services been utilized in order to replace functions previously provided by 
the auditor? 
YES NO 
45 145 
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Question 9:  
What services? 
 
Respondents	  
Strongly	  disagree	   Disagree	   Unchanged	   Agree	   Strongly	  disagree	   No	  opinion	  
Question 10: 
Are these services now better aligned with your expectations?	  
Count:	   1 0 9 8 24 1	  
Percentage	   2,4% 0,0% 21,4% 19,0% 57,1% -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Question 11: 
Has the supply of complementary services increased since the abolishment of the statutory 
audit?	  
Count:	   4 1 39 46 11 88	  
Percentage	   4,0% 1,0% 38,6% 45,5% 10,9% -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
0	   10	   20	   30	   40	  
Other	  
Advisory	  
Accounting	  consultant	  
Tax	  Consultant	  
	   58	  
Question 12: 
Have the prices on complementary services decreased since the abolishment of the statutory 
audit?	  
Count:	   15 15 41 25 16 72	  
Percentage	   13,4% 13,4% 36,6% 22,3% 14,3% -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
 
 
Question 13: 
Has opting out of audit led to an increased cost of capital?	  
Count:	   86 10 52 13 6 20	  
Percentage	   51,5% 6,0% 31,1% 7,8% 3,6% -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Question 14: 
Removed from thesis	  
Question 15: 
Has the choice of opting out of audit (despite employing other complementary services) led to 
cost reductions?	  
Count:	   7 1 14 28 113 5	  
Percentage	   4,3% 0,6% 8,6% 17,2% 69,3% -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
	   59	  
Question 16: 
By what amount? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondents	   Strongly	  disagree	   Disagree	   Unchanged	   Agree	   Strongly	  disagree	   No	  opinion	  
Question 17: 
Have the visitations of Skatteverket increased, leading to more administrative work?	  
Count:	   70 2 87 4 1 24	  
Percentage	   42,7% 1,2% 53,0% 2,4% 0,6% -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
	  
Question	  18:	  
What/which of the following statements led to the decision to opt out of audit? 
6,	  06%	  
18,	  18%	  
19,	  39%	  
22,	  42%	  
33,	  94%	   0-­‐2000	  2000-­‐5000	  5000-­‐7500	  7500-­‐10000	  >	  10000	  
	   60	  
 
	  
Question	  19:	  
Do you consider yourselves to be missing out on added economic values due to the decision of 
opting out of audit? 
 
	  
Respondents	   Strongly	  disagree	   Disagree	   Unchanged	   Agree	   Strongly	  disagree	   No	  opinion	  
31	  
95	  
25	  
124	  
31	  
0	   20	   40	   60	   80	   100	   120	   140	  
None	  of	  the	  above	  
Did	  not	  consider	  the	  auditor	  to	  add	  any	  real	  value	  
The	  audit	  did	  not	  match	  our	  expectations	  
The	  cost	  of	  audit	  exceeded	  the	  percieved	  benecits	  
No	  stakeholders	  demanded	  the	  information	  
165	  
7	  
1	  
11	  
2	  
0	   20	   40	   60	   80	   100	   120	   140	   160	   180	  
None	  of	  the	  above	  
Less	  control	  of	  accounting	  and	  internal	  controls	  
Inferior	  accounting	  quality	  
The	  auditor's	  consulting	  
Inferior	  view	  of	  the	  company's	  cinances	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Question 20: 
Are you satisfied with the decision to opt out of audit?	  
Count:	   2 5 20 14 143 3	  
Percentage	   1,1% 2,7% 10,9% 7,6% 77,7% -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	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Appendix	  IV	  	  Hello,	  	  We	  are	  two	  students	  studying	  Business	  and	  Economics	  at	  the	  Gothenburg	  School	  of	  Business,	  Economics	  and	  Law.	  We	  are	  currently	  writing	  our	  Degree	  Project	  in	  the	  field	  of	  audit	  and	  the	  purpose	  of	  our	  thesis	  is	  to	  investigate	  whether	  expectations	  stated	  prior	  to	  the	  abolishment	  of	  the	  statutory	  audit	  have	  been	  favorable	  for	  you.	  	  	  You	  have	  been	  randomly	  selected	  to	  participate	  in	  our	  survey	  by	  the	  criterion	  that	  you	  after	  the	  change	  in	  legislation	  choose	  to	  opt	  out	  of	  audit.	  	  	  To	  increase	  the	  reliability	  of	  our	  study	  a	  high	  response	  rate	  is	  necessary,	  therefore	  every	  answer	  is	  important	  to	  us.	  	  	  All	  answers	  will	  be	  confidentially	  handled	  and	  every	  respondent	  are	  completely	  anonymous.	  	  	  We	  are	  grateful	  for	  your	  time,	  your	  answers	  make	  a	  difference.	  You	  will	  be	  linked	  to	  the	  survey	  through	  the	  link	  below.	  	  	  LINK	  TO	  WEB	  SURVEY	  	  Thank	  You!	  	  Regards,	  	  Alexander	  Andrén	  Oskar	  Ysander	  
